Harvard Youth Poll
Introduction
A new national poll from the Institute of Politics at Harvard Kennedy School reveals a generation navigating financial hardship, frayed social bonds, and declining trust in institutions. As the nation confronts generational turnover and a volatile political climate, the 50th edition of the Harvard Youth Poll reveals what matters most to young Americans—and what they're losing faith in.
Among the key findings:
- More than 4 in 10 young Americans under 30 say they're "barely getting by" financially, while just 16% report doing well or very well;
- Fewer than half feel a sense of community, with only 17% reporting deep social connection;
- Just 15% believe the country is heading in the right direction, and fewer than one-third approve of President Trump or either party in Congress;
- Traditional life goals are shifting, with only 48% of young Americans saying having children is important;
- Young people who became socially isolated during COVID report higher rates of depression, especially those who were entering high school or college during the pandemic;
- Support for U.S. involvement abroad remains low—and sharply divided by party;
- Only 19% trust the federal government to do the right thing most or all the time.
Together, these findings paint a picture of a generation that feels disconnected from institutions, uncertain about the future, and skeptical that current leadership works in their interest.
Since 2000, the Harvard Public Opinion Project has provided the most comprehensive look at young Americans' political opinions and voting trends. It provides essential insight into the concerns of young Americans at a time when the nation is confronting numerous challenges at home and abroad. President Kennedy once said, "It is a time for a new generation of leadership to cope with new problems and new opportunities." The IOP is preparing a new generation of political leaders to confront these very challenges and gain the ability to successfully lead in today's complicated political landscape. Identifying areas of concern through the Harvard Youth Poll lets tomorrow's political leaders get started on ideas, strategies, and solutions and allows them to decide today what the next generation of political leadership needs to look like.
The Spring 2025 Harvard Youth Poll surveyed 2,096 young Americans between 18 and 29 years old nationwide and was conducted between March 14-25, 2025.
"From significant economic concerns to dramatic feelings of social isolation, and from growing mental health challenges to mounting distrust in the government and both parties, young Americans have apprehensions about what would have seemed unimaginable just a few short years ago," said IOP Director Setti Warren. "These findings are a stark reality check and leaders across the country would be wise to pay close attention."
"This is a generation that's weathered pandemic isolation during formative years, entered an unstable economy, and faced skyrocketing housing and education costs—all while being told they're not resilient enough," said John Della Volpe, Director of Polling at the Institute of Politics. "What Gen Z needs isn't another lecture, but genuine recognition of their struggles and leaders willing to listen before they speak."
"Amid financial hardship and a devastating crisis of community, young Americans are increasingly disillusioned with the world as they struggle to find their place in it," said Jordan Schwartz, Student Chair of the Harvard Public Opinion Project. "This generation doesn't expect politics to solve their problems, but as young Americans continue to lose faith in government institutions, the need for politicians to listen to and learn from young people has never been greater."
Ten key findings from the 50th poll in the biannual series are below.
Key Takeaways
More than 4 in 10 young Americans under 30 are barely getting by financially—with women and non-college youth hit the hardest. Half of young adults without a college degree report financial hardship, compared to 29% of college graduates; only 16% say they're doing well or very well financially.
Ten percent of young Americans struggle to make ends meet, and an additional 32% are getting by with limited financial security. On the other hand, 16% are doing well or very well financially, while 38% of young Americans are comfortable.
These financial struggles are not hitting all of Gen Z equally. Those most affected are women, Hispanics, and young adults without college degrees:
- Nearly half (47%) of young women struggle to make ends meet or get by with limited financial security, compared to 37% of men.
- Just over half (52%) of young Hispanics are struggling to make ends meet or get by with limited financial security, significantly higher than their white (38%) or Black (45%) peers.
- Half (50%) of young people who are not in college and with no degree struggle to make ends meet or get by with limited financial security. In contrast, only 35% of college students and 29% of college graduates are in that position.
Among those who report being in the most vulnerable financial position (struggling or getting by with limited security), 51% believe President Trump's policies will hurt their finances over the next few years, whereas 18% think they will help.
Just 48% of young Americans say having kids is important—the lowest ranking among the six life goals we measured. It signifies a generational shift away from traditional family formation. While both Democrats and Republicans prioritize financial security and homeownership, young Republicans are far more likely to believe those goals—and others—are within reach.
We asked young Americans about life milestones to better understand their goals—and how confident they feel about reaching them. Unsurprisingly, financial security tops the list: 86% say it's important. Homeownership (74%) and finding a long-term romantic partner (67%) follow closely behind.
Fewer young people prioritize traditional family milestones: 57% say getting married is important, and only 48% say the same about having children. However, Republicans are significantly more likely than Democrats to value these family-oriented goals—as well as homeownership.
- Homeownership is important to 85% of young Republicans, compared to 76% of Democrats.
- Getting married is important to 75% of Republicans, compared to 56% of Democrats.
- Having kids is important to 69% of Republicans, compared to 43% of Democrats.
But importance does not always translate into confidence. While 86% of young Americans say financial stability is important, only 56% feel confident they will achieve it. Similar gaps exist across other life goals. Some groups are notably more optimistic than others: Republicans, for example, express greater confidence than Democrats in reaching each of the six milestones we measured.
Though young men and women express similar confidence levels in achieving most milestones, they diverge regarding wealth and romance. More young men than women (38% vs 29%) are confident about accumulating significant wealth. And while men and women rate romantic goals equally important, women are 10 points more likely (62% vs. 52%) to be confident about finding a long-term partner than men and seven points more likely (56% vs. 49%) to be confident about getting married.
These gender differences also extend to how young people approach relationships. A majority of young women (53%) say political agreement is important in a romantic relationship, compared to 42% of young men. The gap is even wider across party lines: 70% of Democrats value political alignment with a partner versus 48% of Republicans and 39% of independents.
That party divide extends beyond relationships into deeper perceptions of gender expectations. While a plurality across parties believes society pressures women to succeed in both career and family life, sharp differences emerge beneath the surface. Young Republicans are far more likely than Democrats (25% vs. 3%) to say women are pressured to prioritize career over family. Conversely, Democrats are about three times more likely than Republicans (32% vs. 11%) to believe society pressures women to prioritize family over career. This stark divergence reveals how cultural narratives around gender roles are deeply shaped by political identity—suggesting that young Americans may be living in fundamentally different worlds when it comes to expectations for women.
Less than half of young Americans feel a sense of community—and just 17% say they're deeply connected to one. Nearly 1 in 3 feel no strong sense of belonging or are still searching for it.
Just one in six (17%) young Americans report being "deeply connected to at least one community." Nearly one in five (18%) "do not feel a strong sense of community anywhere," while 26% feel "somewhat" connected, and 12% are actively searching for community.
The gender gap in belonging is subtle but revealing. While men and women report similar rates of deep connection (18% and 16%, respectively), young women are more likely to feel somewhat connected (30% vs. 23%). In comparison, young men are more likely to report no strong sense of belonging (21% vs. 15%), with similar levels of uncertainty about where they fit in (23% vs. 25%). This suggests that while women may feel more tenuously connected, men are more likely to experience complete detachment.
But the gaps are even wider across other groups.
- Just 34% of independents and unaffiliated young people report a sense of belonging, compared to 51% of Democrats and 56% of Republicans.
- 57% of college students and 58% of college graduates feel connected to a community, compared to 33% of those not in school and without a degree.
- Place matters, too—only 33% of small-town residents and 39% of rural residents feel connected, versus 46% in suburbs and 52% in cities.
Young people who lack a sense of community are not only disconnected from politics—they're also struggling with their mental health. Just 14% of those without strong community ties consider themselves politically engaged, compared to 40% of those who feel deeply connected to a community. The mental health gap is even more stark: 59% of young people who report no sense of belonging say they feel depressed, down, or hopeless for at least several days in the last two weeks—nearly double the rate (33%) among those with community ties.
Young Americans are still grappling with the pandemic's long-term social consequences—especially those entering high school or college when lockdowns began. New data show that 31% report a lasting negative impact on their friendships, and those who experienced isolation during this period are more likely to struggle with their mental health today.
Five years after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, many young Americans' friendships have still not recovered. We asked what lasting impact the pandemic had on young people's social lives, and the results were striking:
- One in five (22%) young Americans became more socially isolated,
- 9% lost touch with friends and never reconnected,
- 7% formed new friendships online, and
- 7% lost touch with friends but reconnected later, while only 3% became more socially active—and
- 49% reported no lasting impact.
More than half (55%) of young Americans who experienced social isolation during the pandemic—such as losing touch with friends and not reconnecting—report at least some symptoms associated with depression, with 18% experiencing moderately severe or severe symptoms. In contrast, among those who say the pandemic had no lasting impact on their friendships, 38% report depressive symptoms, including 13% with moderately severe or severe symptoms.
Further analysis of our survey data reveals a clear and statistically significant pattern in how young Americans experienced long-term social isolation stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. Reported isolation rates vary meaningfully by age, with the highest levels observed among those who were entering high school or college during the 2020 lockdowns. Today, those individuals—now ages 19 and 23—report isolation rates of 38% and 40%, respectively, compared to 23% among those now age 20. Each age group's data point is annotated in the chart below, detailing how old they were during the pandemic. Statistical testing confirms that these differences are not due to chance, suggesting that the pandemic's social fallout has endured—and that it hit hardest at precisely the moments when young people were meant to form lasting connections.
Just 15% say the country is heading in the right direction, and fewer than one-in-three approve of President Trump or Congress; approval of Democrats in Congress has plummeted by half since 2020.
Most young Americans (51%) believe the country is off on the wrong track, while nearly a third (31%) are unsure—underscoring a generation defined by political pessimism and uncertainty.
When asked to compare the current state of America under President Trump to the Biden administration, just one in four (25%) 18- to 29-year-olds say the country is better off now. In contrast, 41% believe America was better off under President Biden. The rest are divided between those who see no difference (14%) and those who aren't sure (17%).
President Trump's job approval among young Americans stands at 31%—virtually unchanged from the 32% reported in Spring 2017 and the 29% recorded in Fall 2020.
While Trump's overall approval has remained stable, support for Democrats has eroded. The share of young Americans who approve of Congressional Democrats has dropped nineteen points since Spring 2017—from 42% to just 23%. In that same period, approval of Congressional Republicans has held steady, inching up slightly from 28% to 29%.
There are also signs of shifting sentiment among key racial groups. Trump's approval among young Black Americans has grown from just 6% in 2017 to 16% today—a statistically significant increase. Meanwhile, approval among young white Americans has declined from 44% to 39%.
Young people's distrust of government extends far beyond the presidency. Only 19% trust the federal government to do the right thing most or all the time. Fewer than one in three express trust in major institutions: Congress (18%), the President (23%), or the Supreme Court (29%).
Young Americans broadly agree that "individual rights and freedoms" lie at the heart of American identity—but beyond that, partisan divisions emerge over what values come next. Republicans prioritize economic opportunity and mobility, while Democrats consider diversity and inclusion the next most important.
To better understand how young Americans view their country, we asked them to select the two values they believe are essential to American identity from a list of ten. One value stood out: "Individual rights and freedoms" was chosen by 35% of respondents—more than any other option—and was the top choice for both young Democrats (44%) and young Republicans (33%). Despite this shared emphasis on personal liberty, the similarities between the left and right essentially end there.
Young Democrats were far more likely to associate American identity with ideals rooted in inclusion and democratic participation. Nearly three in ten (28%) pointed to "diversity and inclusion," while 22% selected "democracy and civic engagement"—both of which reflect a vision of America that prioritizes collective representation, equity, and expanding rights.
Young Republicans, on the other hand, were drawn to a more traditional and individualist interpretation of national identity. After individual freedoms, the following most frequently selected values were "economic opportunity and upward mobility" (27%) and "Christian values" (21%)—underscoring a worldview grounded in meritocracy, faith, and personal responsibility.
These value-divides mirror a deeper emotional split—what it feels like to be American today.
- 76% of young Republicans say they are proud to be American (8% embarrassed and 16% neither)—more than three times the number of young Democrats who say the same (24% proud, 54% embarrassed, 21% neither).
- Independents are more evenly split, with 34% expressing pride, 29% reporting embarrassment—and 34% telling us they are neither proud nor embarrassed.
This divergence reveals not just a generational debate about values but a deeper divide over what kind of country young people want America to be—and whether they believe it's living up to that vision. While individual rights and freedoms remain a rare point of agreement, the meaning of those rights—and who they serve—varies sharply by political identity.
Just 9% of young Americans say DEI initiatives have helped them personally—while 11% say they have hurt them. Many say DEI has had no impact or never encountered such initiatives. One-third aren't sure—highlighting a sense of distance from the debate and sharp divides by race, gender, and party affiliation.
Despite the intense national debate over diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), most young Americans say these initiatives have had little or no impact on their personal lives. Just 9% say DEI efforts have helped them, while 11% say they've hurt. The vast majority either haven't encountered DEI or aren't sure what effect it's had. Roughly one-third of respondents told us they weren't sure how—or if—DEI had touched their lives.
- Among young Democrats, 22% say DEI has helped them, compared to only 3% who say it's been harmful. Among young Republicans, the pattern flips: 21% feel harmed, and only 3% say they've benefited. That contrast—a six-to-one positive skew among Democrats versus a seven-to-one negative skew among Republicans—captures how deeply party identity shapes perceptions of DEI.
- Attitudes about fairness follow similar lines. Across the full sample, more young Americans believe DEI promotes fairness (34%) than reduces it (20%). But this topline conceals the underlying divisions. Seven in ten Democrats (69%) say DEI promotes fairness, compared to 17% of Republicans.
- Support also varies by race, gender, and educational experience. Non-white young people are more likely to believe DEI promotes fairness (37%) than reduces it (13%), while white youth are more divided (33% promote, 23% reduce).
- Women tend to view DEI more positively than men, and support for DEI increases with education: nearly half of the college graduates (47%) say it promotes fairness, compared to just 28% of young adults without a college degree and not currently enrolled.
What emerges is a portrait of a generation that may not have encountered DEI firsthand but holds strong views shaped by identity, ideology, and the information they consume. For many young Americans, DEI is less a personal experience than a cultural symbol that evokes deep, emotional, and often partisan beliefs about fairness, opportunity, and who deserves a seat at the table.
Support for U.S. involvement abroad is low among young Americans—and views diverge sharply by party. While Democrats emphasize human rights and alliance commitments, Republicans are more likely to focus on national security and the domestic costs of international engagement.
Regarding foreign aid, skepticism runs deep: 40% of young Americans believe the U.S. spends too much, compared to just 9% who say it pays too little. Another 13% think spending is about right, while more than a third (35%) say they're unsure. This concern is pronounced among young Republicans—61% believe the U.S. is overspending—whereas Democrats are far less decisive: 38% say they're unsure, and only 25% believe the U.S. is spending too much.
We also asked what young Americans consider valid reasons for U.S. involvement in other countries. The top responses reflect a mix of self-interest and moral concern:
- 47% support intervention to protect allies
- 46% to defend national security
- 44% to prevent human rights violations
- 43% to combat terrorism
But beyond these, support drops off. Only 16% say promoting democracy justifies involvement abroad, and just 13% point to curbing the influence of rival powers—suggesting that broader geopolitical strategy resonates far less than concrete threats or values-based appeals.
Beneath these preferences are clear partisan divides; 64% of young Democrats support intervention to stop human rights abuses, compared to just 34% of Republicans. Democrats are more likely to support protecting allies, while Republicans emphasize defending national security. Economic motivations rank relatively low overall, but slightly more Republicans (26%) than Democrats (21%) cite growing the U.S. economy as a reason to intervene.
Perhaps most striking are young Republicans' views on alliances. Despite placing a high value on national security, they express significant ambivalence about America's global commitments. Just 13% say the U.S. should remain in NATO and uphold current obligations, compared to 46% of Democrats. Nearly a quarter of young Republicans say the U.S. should stay in NATO but scale back involvement, and another 13% say the U.S. should withdraw entirely. A plurality—41%—is unsure what the country should do.
This marks a notable generational shift. As recently as 2019, young Republicans were slightly more likely than Democrats to prioritize defending U.S. allies. Today, the roles have reversed: Young Democrats have become the party of alliance-based foreign policy, while Republicans are increasingly uncertain—or disengaged.
Fewer young Americans now see a crisis at the Southern border—with the agreement dropping 11 points over the past year. This decline spans across party lines, falling 17 points among Democrats, 13 points among Republicans, and 11 points among independents, signaling a broader shift in how young Americans view the issue.
Today, 42% of 18- to 29-year-olds say there is an immigration crisis at the Southern border—down from 53% in Spring 2024. Concern is still highest among young Republicans (64%), but even that has dropped from 77% last year. Among independents, 40% now say there is a crisis (down from 51%). The sharpest decline came among young Democrats, where belief in a crisis fell from 43% to 26%.
Overall, young Democrats are becoming more supportive of immigration. Relative to a year ago, Democrats are twelve points more likely to agree with the statement, "Recent immigration into this country has done more good than harm," while the percentage of young Democrats disagreeing with the statement dropped by seven points.
Net agreement has shifted little among young Republicans, though they are likelier to say they are unsure than last spring (31% vs 17%). Overall, young Americans are split (30% agree, 30% disagree) over whether recent immigration has done more good than harm.
Tariffs, DOGE, abolishing the Department of Education, and other key aspects of President Trump's agenda face limited support from young Americans; of the eight policies polled, none has more than 35% support.
Tariffs—one of the most prominent and timely elements of President Trump's 2025 policy agenda—are deeply unpopular with young Americans. Just 19% of 18- to 29-year-olds support implementing new tariffs on foreign goods, while 50% oppose them outright. But behind that topline figure lies a dramatic partisan divide: nearly half of young Republicans (46%) back tariffs, compared to just 5% of Democrats. Opposition among Democrats is overwhelming—82% are against the policy, with nearly two-thirds strongly opposed.
When we tested a follow-up question introducing the trade-off—supporting tariffs even if they lead to higher prices—overall support held steady. Still, opposition climbed to 56%, driven primarily by Republican drop-off. Within the GOP, support dipped slightly to 43%, while opposition rose to 33%, suggesting that enthusiasm for tariffs may be conditional even among supporters.
This rejection of tariffs reflects a broader generational skepticism toward Trump's agenda. We tested eight proposals associated with his platform—including government restructuring, immigration enforcement, and controversial stances on Gaza and January 6—and not one received majority support. Every policy tested met with more opposition than support, and none polled above 35% approval.
The most supported proposal—creating a federal Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) to reduce waste and increase accountability—garnered just 35% support, with 38% opposed and the rest unsure. Even among young Democrats, who were relatively more open to the idea, nearly two-thirds (62%) opposed it. Notably, Elon Musk, who leads DOGE, is less popular than the program itself. Only 25% of young Americans view Musk favorably, compared to 35% who support the DOGE proposal.
At the bottom of the list was one of the most inflammatory ideas: the United States taking control of and redeveloping the Gaza Strip, displacing Palestinians. Just 14% of young Americans supported the policy, while 54% opposed it. Among Democrats, support was almost nonexistent—only 4% backed it, while 77% opposed it. Even among Republicans, support was limited and conflicted: 31% supported, 33% opposed, and 35% were unsure—suggesting discomfort or ambivalence even within Trump's young base.
Across the board, uncertainty remains high. For every proposal tested, at least 20% of young Americans said they were unsure or had no opinion. That ambiguity highlights a generation still forming views on many key policy issues—even as they express broad resistance to Trump's current platform.
Methodology
This poll of 2,096 18-to-29-year-olds was organized with undergraduate students from the Harvard Public Opinion Project (HPOP) and supervised by John Della Volpe, Director of Polling. Data were collected by Ipsos Public Affairs using the KnowledgePanel. KnowledgePanel provides probability-based samples with an "organic" representation of the study population for measurement of public opinions, attitudes, and behaviors. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish between March 14 and 25, 2025. The target population for this survey is U.S. residents between the ages of 18 and 29. To ensure the representativeness of the sample, data were weighted to match national population benchmarks for 18- to 29-year-olds by age, gender, race/Hispanic ethnicity, education, household income, census region by metropolitan status, and primary language among Hispanics. This year’s weights also included party identification and voter registration status, based on national estimates from Pew’s National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS) and the U.S. Census Bureau’s Voting Supplement. The margin of error for the total sample is +/- 3.21%.
