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Note to readers. It seems odd to write about anything other than our national emergency, the campaign to assemble unfettered autocratic and extortionate power by taking over or hobbling the free institutions of civil society that make Democracy in America possible: law, journalism, business, the arts, the sciences, the academy, philanthropy, and more. Lacking expertise in studies of emerging autocracy, I haven’t written on this (yet).

Casual impression suggests that Americans seem to be in an increasingly despondent mood–and may have been going in a doleful direction for a while, even before Covid and the 2024 election. For example, in 2019, a large majority of polled Americans said that we are angrier now than we were a generation ago.

This post asks whether our impression of growing 21st century malaise is accurate and, if it is, who has been suffering from this malaise, when, and why. It does not cover Americans’ mental health—clinical depression, anxiety, suicidal impulses, and the like. That is for another day. This is about mood, not disorder, most specifically about Americans’ expressions of unhappiness and dissatisfaction.

There does not appear to have been between 2000 and 2020 a major or widespread deterioration in Americans’ “subjective well-being,” but perhaps modestly rising unhappiness among some White Americans. If so, why? Granting that changes in the material conditions of life may have dismayed some Americans, I explore the possibility that feelings about their private lives may have been affected by the clearly growing and generalized negativity Americans feel about their public lives.

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This essay was first published by The Dispatch on March 10, 2025.

Americans are about to undergo a dramatic social experiment. For generations, our values and ways of life have shifted leftward—that is, toward a more individualized, permissive, secular, do-your-own-thing direction. Now, members of Donald Trump’s coalition have signaled their intent to use the levers of national government to reverse the cultural momentum. How likely are they to succeed?

Illustration by Noah Hickey for The Dispatch

Over about three generations, more and more Americans departed from the supposedly traditional ways of life typically associated with the 1950s. Family changed as, for example, Americans married later, if at all, and had fewer children. Women’s roles changed as girls obtained advanced education and mothers went out to work. Sexual license expanded, with more Americans seeing premarital sex and homosexuality as normal. Christian hegemony declined, as did religious affiliation generally. The historical hierarchy of race was shaken, most vividly evident in the rise of black-white marriages. An interesting exception is views on abortion, which have remained pretty constant on average but become severely polarized by party. So widespread and persistent has this progressive shift been that it has fueled a counter-revolutionary culture war, a vigorous defense of “the traditional American way of life” by the political right, with some of the defenders even contemplating using physical force.

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1953 (Wikimedia Commons)

Meta’s (Facebook’s) Mark Zuckerberg’s recent embrace of his masculine side (as he also embraced Donald Trump) spotlights the connection in our era between American politics and masculinity.

Exactly two years ago, in a post entitled, “The Culture Has Moved Left… So the Right has Mobilized,” I listed several ways that the left had been winning the American culture wars around religion, race, family, and “manliness.” Regarding manliness, I pointed to trends such as the sharp decline in military service and in hunting, and, most substantively, the long decline of the traditional “breadwinner” family, one where the husband earns while the wife cares for the home. I argued that the right mobilized in the 2010s in reaction, trying to halt or reverse these cultural trends. The 2024 political contest had more than a whiff of testosterone gunpowder.

Now, a just-released, mainly online survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in the midst of that 2024 campaign sheds more light on the struggles over masculinity. The traditional forces won the battle in 2024, but may still be losing the war over defining manliness.

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Asterisk Magazine asked me to write up an updated, in some ways meatier, version of previous posts on friendship and loneliness. For those interested in the latest, including discussion of what might have happened in the late 2010s, here is the link: The Myth of the Loneliness Epidemic.

 

It’s early days for any scholarly analysis of the election results, but time enough for punditry and recriminations. I have no novel or great insights, but I do have a few questions. First, Why did Harris do so well?

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There’s been a good deal of discussion lately about the gender gap in polls on Harris vs. Trump, with particular note of Trump’s popularity with young men, even young men of color. I use this brief post to resurrect a graph I had constructed but buried in the footnotes of my 2022 post on “The Culture Has Moved Left… So the Right has Mobilized.” It displays the dramatic decline of the classic male breadwinner role.

I used the General Social Survey to calculate the percentage of all American men aged 30 to 64 who were (a) married and (b) employed full-time and (c) whose spouses were not in the labor force from 1972 through 2018–that is, the percentage of classic male breadwinners (versus the unmarried or unemployed or underemployed and/or the men who had a wife who worked for pay).

 

I haven’t searched for comparable data to go back to, say, 1955 (when America was “great”) but would assume that the breadwinner percentage would have been much higher than the 46% in 1972. For American men who feel that this role is vital to making a man a man, the historical shift is highly distressing.

Since 2010, this blog has described growing political polarization in the United States. Polarization has been less a matter of Americans becoming extremists—most remain centrists or oblivious to politics—but more that politically engaged Americans have increasingly aligned their views, values, and even their practices, from where they live to what they drive to where they pray, with their politics.

DALL-E

Accordingly, public as well as scholarly interest in the topic has soared in just the last dozen or so years.[1] And so acute has polarization become that it increasingly undermines efforts to accurately measure how acute it has become.

Both the surveys and the administrative data that researchers use to track polarization are increasingly distorted by polarization itself. I discuss this development here. In a later post, I will discuss research on polarization itself published since I last reviewed it (here and here).

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WILLIE MAYS, 1931-2024

Video- and podcaster, blogger and renaissance man Chuong Nguyen noted that this year is the 30th anniversary of the publication and heavily-promoted unveiling of Herrnstein and Murray’s, The Bell Curve. I sent Chuong a copy of Fischer et al, Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth (1996) and he invited me back on his videocast to discuss. Here is the video link; and here is just the audio.

Everywhere, it seems, we are urged to “address the root causes” of our problems. The phrase “root causes” is novel; until the 1970s, writers of American books, newspapers, and academic journals almost never mentioned “root causes.” And then they did–at an accelerating pace, right up to the present.[1]

So we now read that we need “community programs to address the root causes of violence [in New York City subways]”; that a progressive district attorney should not be blamed for a jump in crime, because “to prevent crime you have to address the root causes of crime,’ such as unemployment”; and “that we need to “address the root causes of migration—violence and insecurity, poverty, pervasive corruption, lack of educational and economic opportunity, and the impacts of climate change.”

Ivory-tower academics like me love looking for root causes. My own Made in America claims that we can best understand current American culture by finding its roots in American culture 300 years ago. But, if our concern is dealing with today’s problems today, addressing root causes is too often an unhelpful and distracting tactic. This post goes on to explain why.

(Two notes: (1) Matt Yglesias recently had a related column: “Ask how to solve problems, not why they happened”; and (2) there is apparently a specific procedure in engineering and technical operations called “Root Cause Analysis,” which I am not discussing here.)

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